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The first well successfully drilled in North America for crude oil pro-
duction was in Canada at Oil Springs, Ontario, in 1857. The Canadian in-
dustry was, nevertheless, soon outstripped in production by its United
States counterpart. By 1940, Canada produced only 0.4 percent of the world's
oil as compared to the United States' 62 percent of world production. In
1947, however, the discovery of a three billion barrel reservoir at Leduc,
Alberta, marked the birth of the modem Canadian oil and gas industry. By
1974, Canada's share of an exploding world production had increased to
6 percent.
The Canadian oil and gas industry between 1857 and 1947 did not
generate a body of jurisprudence adequate to regulate the industry in its
immense subsequent growth. The "casual" approach to mineral leasing
previously employed, where each lease was typed individually, was no
longer appropriate. After reviewing United States jurisprudence and bene-
fiting from its 100 years of drafting and litigation experience, Canadian
lawyers in 1947 developed a standardized form based on the United States
Producers 88 Lease.1 The lease sought by express provision to minimize the
significance of implied covenants. Modem private and Crown leases have
continued this approach. The use of these standardized leases, however, has
not completely precluded the implication of covenants in Canadian gas and
oil leases. This article will discuss implied covenants in Canadian gas and
oil leases and compare them with covenants implied in oil and gas leases
in the United States.
II. ImpiE=D CovENANTs TO DEvEiop
A. In the United States
The United States doctrine of implied covenants to develop in oil and
gas leases has been attributed to several industry practices and notions pres-
ent at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, notably the
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following:2 (1) the primary object and principal consideration of an oil and
gas lease was the payment of royalties; (2) minerals were both inexhaustible
and fugacious 3 and of no value until captured and marketed; thus it was in
the best interests of lessor, lessee and the general public that they be cap-
tured as quickly and completely as possible; (3) the need to protect the
substantial pecuniary interest of the lessor over which the lessee has control.
In response to these ideas, United States courts fashioned a doctrine of im-
plied covenants, 4 which embraced: (1) the implied covenant to drill an
exploratory well; (2) the implied covenant to conduct additional develop-
ment after paying production is obtained; (3) the implied covenant for dili-
gent and proper operation of wells; (4) the implied covenant to market or
utilize the products; and (5) the implied covenant to protect the leased
premises against drainage by wells drilled on adjoining lands.
The Court in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.5 offered the following ra-
tionale for the implication of covenants in oil and gas leases:
Considering the migratory nature of oil and gas, and the dan-
ger of their being drawn off through wells on other lands if the
field should become fully developed, all of which must have been
in the minds of the parties, it is manifest that the terms of the
lease contemplated action and diligence on the part of the lessee.
There could not well have been an express stipulation as to the num-
ber of wells to be drilled, as to when the wells, other than the first,
should be drilled, or as to the rate at which the production there-
from should proceed, because these matters would depend in large
measure upon future conditions, which could not be anticipated
with certainty .... The subject was, therefore, rationally left to
implication, necessarily arising in the absence of express stipulation,
that the further prosecution of the work should be along such lines
as would be reasonably calculated to effectuate the controlling
intention of the parties as manifested in the lease, which was to
2. See Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on
Rights of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5TH ANN.
INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125 (1954). Moses, Development of
Modern Oil and Gas Lease, 2ND ANN. INST. N OL AND GAS LAw AND TAYXATION
1 (1951). See also M. MERmILL, CovErATs IMPLIED IN O Ar.N GAS LEASES
28 (2nd ed. 1940).
8. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc. Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
Unlike coal, iron, and other minerals, [oil and gas] do not have a
fixed situs under a particular portion of the surface, but are capable of
flowing from place to place and of being drawn off by wells penetrating
their natural reservoir at any point. They are part of the land, and
belong to the owner so long as they are in it, or are subject to his
control; but when they flow elsewhere, or are brought within the con-
trol of another by being drawn off through wells drilled in other land,
the title of the former owner is gone.
Id. at 809.
4. E. BRowN, THE LAw or On. AND GAS LEASES § 16.02 (1958).
5. 140 F. 801, 810 (8th Cir. 1905).
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make the extraction of oil and gas from the premises of mutual ad-
vantage and profit.6
In construing oil and gas leases, United States courts generally favor implied
covenants for development.7
B. In Canada
The need for express provisions in Canadian leases might be questioned
insofar as the influential circumstances fostering the doctrine of implied
covenants in the United States were and are absent in the growth and
development of the modem Canadian oil and gas industry. Erroneous be-
liefs as to the availability and properties of oil and gas have long since
been corrected. It is obvious today that the world's resources of oil and gas
are finite and that oil does not "flow in streams." Today's marketing require-
ments encourage conservation. Stable market conditions demand a steady
and certain supply of oil; such may be obtained by securing reserves for
the future. The Canadian climate is one in which conservation is demanded
along with production.8
This attitude is manifested in Canada's conservation legislation. Section
5 of the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Act9 provides, inter alia:
The purposes of this Act are (a) to effect the conservation of, and
to prevent the waste of, the oil, gas and crude bitumen resources
of Alberta; (b) to secure the observance of safe and efficient
practices... (c) to afford each owner the opportunity of obtaining
his share of production of oil or gas from any pool or of crude
bitumen from any oil sands deposit ....
The statutes of British Columbia,10 Saskatchewan," and Canada 2 afford
similar declarations of public policy. It thus appears that Canadian courts
will not be as well-disposed as United States courts to the implication of
covenants to develop in oil and gas leases.
6. Id. at 811-12. See H. WmLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 OiLAND GAS LAw
§ 802 (1972).
7. E. BROWN, Tm LAw OF OIL AD GAs LEASES § 16.01 (1958).
8. 1914 was the year of the first major oil discovery in Canada at Turner
Valley in Alberta. Flaring of residue gas up to 600 million cubic feet per day
upon 4,000 barrels of condensate during production has limited the possible
amount recoverable to 1.2 million barrels of condensate. It is estimated that with
proper production techniques it would have been possible to recover half a
billion barrels. "It was Alberta's first, and last costly lesson in petroleum con-
servation." E. GRAY, IM IACT OF OM 11 (1969).
The judicial approach at the turn of the century is indicated in Lang v.
Provincial Gas and Fuel Co., [1908] 12 O.L.R. 262. Chancellor Boyd commented:
In oil contracts, time is of the essence of the bargain, and a strict
rather than a lax reading would be appropriate with reference to the
drilling or sinking of a well.
9. R.S.A. 1970 c. 267.
10. Petroleum and Natural Gas Act S.B.C. 1965 c. 33.
11. The Mineral Resources Act R.S.S. 1965 c. 50.
12. Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act. R.S.C. 1970 c. 0-4.
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Although a policy of conservation may predominate, it does not pre-
clude the implication of obligations to develop upon the lessee arising from
his relationship to the lessor. Canadian courts will respect the intentions of
the parties to the lease. The task of the Canadian court in the interpretation
of documents was described in Toronto Railway Co. v. City of Toronto:13
In construing an instrument in writing, the court is to consider what
the facts were in respect to which the instrument was framed, and
the object as appearing from the instrument, and taking all these
together it is to see what is the intention appearing from the lan-
guage when used with reference to such facts and with such an
object .... 14
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta recently applied
such analysis to an oil and gas lease in Cull v. Canadian Superior Oil.'5
Unlike United States courts,'8 however, Canadian courts do not follow
the maxim that an oil and gas lease should be construed in favor of the
lessor and against the lessee. The validity of the maxim in Canada would
seem confined to securing construction of a lease against the party who pre-
pared it, in cases of ambiguity or uncertainty and where other rules of
construction fail.17 Canadian courts do, nevertheless, recognize that parties
ordinarily contract under the assumption that the other party will cooperate
in order to carry out the purposes of the contract. In 1849, Chief Justice
Wilde"" concluded that an agreement between A and B that A shall buy
certain property from B imports an understanding by B to sell the property
to A. The learned Chief Justice commented:
The form of the deed does not shew clearly in one part a covenant
by the plantiff, and in another part a covenant by the defendants:
13. [1906] 37 Can. S. Ct. 430.
14. Id. at 484 (Sedgewick, J.).
15. [1970] 75 W.W.R. 606, 611; See also 16 D.L.R. 3d 709, 713 (Alta.
C.A.), aff'd, [1971] 3 W.W.R. 28; [1971] 20 D.L.R. 3d 360 (S. Ct. Can.),
where the court commented: "In interpreting these clauses we must keep in mind
the realities of the situation and the purposes which are contemplated by the
lease."
16. E. BnowN, LAw OF Om A m GAs L__sEs § 16.04 (1958).
17. Shell Oil Co. v. Gibbard, [1961] S.C.R. 725
The lease, as stated, was proposed in its present form by Griffith and,
in my opinion, if there were ambiguity in the language employed and
doubt raised as to the meaning of such language, it should, if need be,
be construed in accordance with the maxim verba chartarum fortius
accipintur contra proferentem ....
This rule of construction is to be applied only when other rules of con-
struction fail ....
Id. at 781. This approach indicates little judicial sympathy for the "poor,
ignorant and illiterate farmer," whose persona as lessor has been suggested as
promoting the doctrine of implied convenants. Williams, Comments on Oil and
Gas Jurisprudence in Canada and the United States, 4 ALTA. L. REv. 189, 190
(1965-66). The rule might also work against the Crown as lessor in the develop-
ment of Crown minerals but for an ancient rule of uncertain efficacy: "The
King's grant is taken most strongly against the grantee and most favourably for
the King." Willion v. Berkley [1562] 1 P. Com. 223, 243.
18. Wood v. The Governor and Company of Copper Miners in England,
[1849] 7 C.B. 906.
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but it is an instrument under seal, and the intention of the parties
is sufficiently apparent from the whole language of it: it shews,
with reasonable certainty, what it is that was intended to be con-
tracted for by each party. 9
The modem United States doctrine of implied covenants is suggested to
rest upon this notion--"the principle of co-operation."20 Such an approach
was approved by the Appellate Division of Alberta Supreme Court in the
interpretation of an oil and gas contract in Canadian Delhi Oil Ltd. V.
Alminex Ltd.21 The unstartling conclusion is that courts will try to afford
proper recognition to the lessee's need to control or administer the lessor's
mineral interest and effectuate the objects of the parties as indicated by the
language of the lease. Canadian courts may therefore imply covenants to
develop in situations where such covenants were intended by the parties and
do not conflict with the public policy reflected in the Canadian conservation
legislation.
III. Tim EFFEcT OF CONSERVATION LEGISLATION ON IMPLIED COVENANTS
Conservation legislation in Canada imposes spacing22 and proration-
ing23 requirements that differ from the obligations that might otherwise be
implied under an oil and gas lease. Drilling is regulated by the spacing
requirement, albeit at limited injury to lessor or lessee because the require-
ment is based on the notion of efficient drainage of a reservoir. Production
is controlled by the prorationing allowance attributable to the well.
The particular significance of such legislation arises from the presump-
tion that the parties intend to contract with reference to the law existing at
the time the contract is made. No covenant will be implied that is incon-
sistent with legislation in effect at the time of the formation of the lease,
and, in the event subsequent legislation renders performance impossible,
19. Id. at 936.
20. H. WLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 5 Om AND GAS LAw § 802.1 (1972).
21. [1967] 62 W.W.R. 513.
It is necessary first to ascertain what is the commercial nature or pur-
pose of the adventure that is the subject of the contract; that ascertained,
it has next to be asked what within this scope are the essential terms,
which, so far as not expressed, must be implied in order to make the
contract efficacious as a business instrument.
Id. at 523, quoting Lord Radcliffe in Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thor. 1, [1962]
A.C. 93, 122, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 633.
22. Canadian conservation legislation essentially provides that only one oil
well may be drilled per 160 acres and one gas well per 640 acres. This minimum
surface area is called the spacing unit.
23. The Energy Resources Conservation Board (in the province of Alberta)
or the Oil and Gas Conservation Board (in the Provinces of British Columbia and
Saskatchewan) allocates a maximum amount that may be produced from each
well. This is called the "allowable" for that well. The "allowable" for each well is
determined according to the available market for production and/or the maximum
efficient rate of production for each well.
1974]
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the covenantor will be excused from performance.2 4 This reasoning was
applied in Vulcan-Brown Petroleums v. Mercury Oils Ltd.,25 where the court
found no promise to drill a second well because such drilling would have
contravened drilling regulations.20
In Reynolds v. Ackerman,27 however, the Alberta Supreme Court con-
cluded that the conservation legislation did not excuse a failure to drill on
the part of the covenantor.281 At the time of the formation of the lease, con-
servation legislation required a minimum spacing unit requirement in Alberta
of 40 acres; the lease encompassed only 10 acres. The trial judge's decision
may be explained on the basis that the covenant implied did not impose a
duty inconsistent with the legislation. "Perhaps there is an inference that
the lessee in such a case should attempt to obtain a special spacing unit or
arrange for pooling with the balance of the acreage comprising the spacing
unit."29 This explanation is not evident in the court's language, but both
traditional"0 and American3' authority does support such a position.
Lessees have sought to ensure that no liability is imposed for breach
of an implied covenant when performance will be in contravention of con-
servation legislation by the use of "compliance with laws" clauses. An
example of such a clause:
The lessee shall conduct all its operations on the said lands
in compliance with the provisions of law applicable to such opera-
tions, and where such provisions of law conflict or are at variance
with the provisions of this lease, such provisions of law shall prevail.
24. Baily v. De Crespigny, [1869] L.R. 4 Q.B. 180; 8 Has. Laws (3rd ed.)
contracts', § 319. See also § 21 Oil and Gas Conservation Act R.S.A. 1970 c. 267,
which declares that conservation legislation regulation and orders override con-
flicting terms of any contract and such terms are unenforceable.
25. Vulcan-Brown Petroleum Ltd. v. Mercury Oils Ltd., [1942] 1 W.W.R.
138, [1942] 1 D.L.R. 209 (Alta. C.A.), aff'd, [1943] S.C.R. 37, [1943] 1
D.L.R. 369.
26. Id. at 150. The court, per Justice Clarke, reasoned:
In the present case I think there was no absolute promise [to drill a
second well in an oil and gas lease]. It is evident that the plaintiff could
not fulfill the agreement to drill the second well, and also observe the
regulation which prevent the drilling, so it is necessary to infer an
implied term, and I think it a reasonable implication that the agree-
ment to drill is subject to there being no prevention by the regulation
which both parties were bound to observe.
27. [1960] 32 W.W.R. 289 (Alta. S.C.).
28. justice McBride commented:
I find no excuse or explanation in any regulation, or the fact that maybe
a minimum acreage of 40 acres is required, to resolve in favour of the
plaintiff the implied covenant in question which otherwise appears on
the face of the instrument.
Id. at 298.
29. Brown, Problems in Development of Leased Lands, 4 ALTA. L. REv. 302.
See also Canada-Cities Service Petroleum Corp. v. Kininmonth, [1964] 34 W.W.R.
392, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 56.
30. J. W. Taylor & Co. v. Landowner & Co., [1940] 4 All E.R. 335.
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The efficacy of this clause was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Mercury Oils v. Vulcan-Brown Petroleums.32 The court affirmed the rea-
soning of the Alberta Court of Appeal, which Justice Ford had expressed
as follows:
In my opinion the proper view is that while the covenant to com-
mence the drilling of a second well within the time stipulated is not
'repealed' by the supervening illegality or impossibity, the conse-
quences of not so commencing do not presently arise.33
In order to secure the protection of the "compliance with laws" clause
it must be established that the covenanted performance is rendered impos-
sible of performance by the conservation legislation. The protection of the
clause was denied to a lessee in Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. & Sourry-
Rainbow Oil Ltd. v. Kanstrup.34 The lease provided for its termination in
the event of a failure to produce at the expiration of the primary term. The
lessee contended that regulations requiring him to keep his well capped
excused, under a "compliance with laws" clause, his failure to produce
during the primary term.35 The court found that the lessees failure to pro-
duce for sale or use was because there was no market or use for the gas,
and not because of the regulations.36
IV. CErA ExPREss PROVISIONS CommON IN CANADIAN LEASES AND
THmE EFrEcr ON IMPLnE CoVENANrs
It is, of course, impossible to imply in a contract any term or condi-
tion inconsistent with its express provisions, or with the intention of
the parties as gathered from those provisions.37
32. [1943] Can. L.R. 37 (1942), [1943] 1 D.L.R. 369 (1942).
33. [1942] 1 W.W.R. 138, 152, [1942] 1 D.L.R. 209, 228. The court met
the lessor's argument that the lessee should have foreseen the change in the
regulations as follows:
The argument that the change in the regulations, to which, as is com-
mon ground the impossibility of performance is due, is something which
should have been foreseen by the respondent and provided against, and
of which he must be deemed to have taken the risk, is answered by this,
that it was foreseen as much by one party as the other and was guarded
against by the requirement that all regulations present or future were
to be obeyed.
Id. at 152.
34. [1965] Can. L.R. 92 (1964), 49 W.W.R. 257, 47 D.L.R. 2d 1.
35. The lessee argued that he
was precluded by law from blowing gas from its well into the air, and
as it was bound by a Board order to keep the well capped, compliance
with these legal requirements should not, under [a 'compliance with
laws' clause], constitute a cause for the termination of the lease.
Id. at 103-04.
36. Id. at 103-04.
37. F.A. Tamplin S.S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [1916]
2 A.C. 397, at 422, 85 L.J.K.B. 1389, per Lord Parker, quoted with approval by
Smith, C.J.A., in Canadian Delhi Oil v. Aliminex, [1967] 62 W.W.R. 518, 525(Alta. S.C., App. Div.).
1974]
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A. Private Leases
Private leases are those held from a party other than the Crown. The
form of the typical lease owes much to the experience of the oil and gas
industry in the United States.
"[T]he western Canadian oil industry has absorbed not only engineer-
ing and geological techniques developed in the United States, but also
documents which had their origin and raison d'etre in the judicial pronounce-
ments of the Texas and Oklahoma courts."38
The majority of private Canadian oil and gas leases are drawn up by
the lessee oil companies. In contrast to these leases is the so-called "lessor's
lease." Substantial holdings of minerals by a few large corporations, in par-
ticular the Hudson's Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway, have
enabled them to impose terms which differ considerably from those found
in other private leases. The Hudson's Bay Company obtained 7 million
acres, from which it reserved mineral rights upon transfer to settlers after
1908, in return for its efforts in the development of Canada. The Canadian
Pacific Railway obtained 22 million acres, from which it reserved mineral
rights after 1902, in return for the building of the trans-Canada railway. The
Canadian Pacific Railway conducts its oil and gas operations under the
name Pan Canadian Petroleum. The terms of a lessor's lease are generally
more protective of the lessor's interests than are the "lessees leases" nor-
mally employed by the oil companies.
1. The Covenant to Drill Exploratory Wells Promptly
The implication of covenants requiring prompt exploratory and de-
velopmental drilling in the United States led to the emergence of express
provisions dealing with delays in development.39 Compensation for such
delays was provided in the form of cash bonuses at the time of the agree-
ment to lease and by the payment of "delay rentals." The oil and gas leases
in use in Canada reflect such development and an "unless" clause or "drill
or pay" clause is invariably present.
A "drill or pay" clause was litigated in 1906 in Docker v. London-Elgin
Oil Co.40 The plaintiff sought to establish a breach of a covenant to drill.
The lease was for a ten-year term and provided:
This lease is made for the purpose of enabling the lessee and his
assigns, and he is and they are hereby authorized and empowered
to sink or drill oil wells ....
... [the lessee] will commence operations upon the said premises
88. Ballem, The Perilous Life of an Oil and Gas Lease, 44 CAN. BAR REv.
523, 528 (1966).
89. Lewis, The Canadian Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease, 80 CAN. BAR
REv. 965 (1952); Moses, Development of Modern Oil and Gas Lease, 2ND ANN.
INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATIoN 1 (1951).
40. [1907] 10 O.W.R. 1056 affirmed [1908] 11 O.W.R. 726 C.C.A. 1.
[Vol. 39
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on or before the first day of November, 1902, or will pay to the
lessor or his assigns the sum of $6 per month from the date hereof
until operations are commenced on the said premises.
Chief Justice Mulock concluded:
I do not construe the covenant as an unconditional one to make such
commencement [of operations], but an alterative covenant to do
one of two things namely, either to make such commencement or to
pay $6 a month from the date of the lease.41
The court went so far as to grant the lessee equitable relief from forfeiture
for nonpayment of the rent.42
The "unless" clause 43 was similarly declared effective to preclude the
implication of a covenant to drill an exploratory well in East Crest Oil Co.
v. Strohschein.44 This might suggest that in Canada, the implied covenant
to drill an exploratory well "has been rendered a dead letter by the develop-
ment of the oil and gas lease form."45
Such a conclusion, however, may be premature. In Reynods v. Acker-
man,40 the parties in 1949 prepared a two-page typewritten lease which
provided:
'lessor', did thereby demise and lease unto the plaintiff as the 'lessee'
for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for water, oil
and gas and of laying pipeline and of building tanks, stations and
structures thereon necessary and convenient to take care of the said
products, all of the lands which are then described ....
41. Id. at 1057-58.
42. Id. at 1059-60.
Plaintiffs counsel contended that the real object of the lease was to
secure to the plaintiff the operation of the lands for mining purposes,
and that, therefore, no equitable relief could be given to the defendants,
because of their default in payment of the rent, and he relied upon the
words quoted above from the lease: 'This lease is made for the purpose
of enabling the lessee, his heirs and assigns, and he is and they are
hereby authorized and empowered, to sink, drill,' etc. The fair meaning
of these words is not to create a duty on the lessee to operate, but
merely to confer upon him the right to do so, and therefore they in no
way modify the nature of the alternative covenant above quoted, which
is the only provision in the lease obliging the defendants and then only
in the alternative, to operate.
43. A typical "unless" clause is found in East Crest Oil Co. v. Strohschein,[1951-52] 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 553, 555 [1952] 2 D.L.L. 432, 433-34 (Alta. S.C.
App. Div.).
Provided that if operations for drilling are not commenced on the
said land on or before one year from the date hereof the lease shall
then terminate as to both parties unless on or before such anniversary
date the Lessee shall pay or tender to the Lessor .. .the sum of One
Hundred and Sixty Dollars which shall be known as delay rental and
shall cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling oper-
ations for a period of one year.
Id. at 555, [1952] 2 D.L.R. at 433-34.
44. [1951-52] 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 553, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 432 (Alta. S.C.
App. Div.).
45. H. WimLLIMs & C. M .EYs, 5 Om AND GAs LAw § 812 (1972).
46. [1960] 32 W.W.R. 289 (Alta. S.C.).
1974]
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... for a term of three years from the date thereof at a rental of
one-eighth part of all oil produced and saved on the said lands ....
The lessee shall pay to the lessor for the said period of three (3)
years of this lease the sum of Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars upon
the execution of this lease, (receipt whereof is hereby acknowl-
edged). This lease shall be subject to renewal for a further term
from year to year by the lessee paying to the lessor in advance, the
sum of One ($1.00) Dollar per acre per year, provided that all the
covenants of the lessee therein contained, shall have been fully
done and performed. 47
Even though there was no express covenant to drill, the court held that
there was an implied covenant to drill an exploratory well. The basis for
the implied covenant was that there was no provision terminating the lease
if the lessee failed to conduct drilling or exploration.48 The court distin-
guished East Crest by noting that the lease in that case did contain a
termination clause, but did not contain any provision for extension of the
term or for delay rental.49 The court believed that allowing the lessee to
hold the land for an indefinite number of years simply by paying the insig-
nificant "rental" in the lease could not have been the intention of the
parties.50
The learned judge described the renewal payment as "rental." Reynolds
appears to be founded on the doctrine established in the Indiana decision of
Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Littler,51 described by Summers as follows:
In the light of the relations of the parties under the forms of lease
above mentioned [nominal initial cash consideration for a 'long-
term' or 'no-term' lease reserving nominal rental for delay] and the
well-established principles of law and policy with respect to the
construction and interpretation of oil and gas leases, it is not at all
strange that the courts, to effect justice, overlooked the express
intention of the parties in such leases, to the effect that development
of the property might be indefinitely postponed by the payment of
delay rental, and found that their intent was that the land should
be developed within a reasonable time, and enforced that intention
by implying into such leases a condition to develop the land within
a reasonable time after notice on the pain of forfeiture. '2
Littler was decided in accord with the then well established principle of
47. Id. at 290.
48. Id. at 297-98 (McBride, I.).
In the case at bar that is a very material distinction. Here we have no
provision which terminates the lease if nothing is done by the lessee
in the way of drilling or exploration during the first term of three
years, nor, for that matter, if the lease is capable of renewal from year
to year, is there any express covenant on the part of the lessee to drill
during any of those subsequent renewals. That being so, if I were
required to make a finding on the question now under discussion, I
should find that there was an implied covenant.
49. Id. at 297.
50. Id. at 298.
51. 162 Ind. 320, 70 N.E. 363 (1904).
52. W. SumE ns, 2 Om A Nm GAs § 397, at 541 (1959).
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construction that oil and gas leases should be so construed as to promote
development and prevent delay. It is suggested that the application of the
principle of Littler to the circumstances of Reynolds is regrettable. The
decision might better have emphasized the small amount of consideration
given for the lease, i.e., the cash consideration and royalties from produc-
tion. Such analysis would also entail the implication of a covenant to drill.
The principle of Littler was inappropriate to Reynolds because the lan-
guage of the Reynolds lease referred to renewal, not rental, and thus did not
indicate a consideration in lieu of drilling.
Reynolds is especially significant because at least two major oil and gas
enterprises use "rental clauses" that do not expressly defer the obligation to
drill. The leases employed by the Hudson's Bay Company and Petrofina
Canada provide:
The lessee will pay or cause to be paid to the lessor an annual rental
of Dollars, being at the rate of One ($1.00) Dollar per
acre payable in advance on the day of
in each year of the term of the lease.
It is suggested that the moving consideration for such a lease is the royal-
ties from production, depending on the size of the initial cash consideration
and length of the term of the lease. Reynolds suggests that a Canadian court
would not be reluctant to imply a covenant to drill an exploratory well in
such circumstances.
2. The Covenant of Diligent and Proper Operation
United States jurisprudence has established an implied covenant for
diligent and proper operation of wells. The imposition of such a duty on
the lessee would seem in accord with a modem understanding of the expec-
tations of reasonable men in the positions of the lessor and lessee. The
significance of the implied covenant in Canada, however, is limited by the
prevalence of express provisions and the regulation of drilling practices by
legislation.
Only one oil company53 indicated that it employed a lease without an
express provision concerning operations, and even the form of lease there
employed contained a "compliance with laws" clause. The overwhelming
majority of private leases used in the industry contain the following:
The lessee shall conduct all its operations on the said lands in a
diligent, careful and workmanlike manner and in compliance with
the provisions of law applicable to such operations, and where such
provisions of law conflict or are at variance with the provisions of
this lease, such provisions of law shall prevail.
The clause is a mere restatement of the provision that might otherwise be
implied. A "lessor's lease" that appears to impose a higher standard is that
of Pan Canadian Petroleum Ltd.:
58. Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. Ltd.
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The lessee shall conduct its operations on the said lands in a dili-
gent, careful and workmanlike manner with a view to the maximum
recovery of the leased substance from the said lands and in com-
pliance with the law applicable to such operations ....
Conservation statutes and regulations set down mandatory procedures
in drilling operations. Such procedures may conflict with that demanded by
the duty to conduct operations in the "diligent, careful and workmanlike
manner" specified in the lease provisions above. The "compliance with
laws" provisions seek to protect the lessee in such circumstances.
3. The Covenant to Protect the Premises Against Drainage
In the absence of an express covenant the [United States] courts
uniformly hold that there is an implied covenant on the part of the
lessee to drill wells offsetting those on adjoining lands which are
draining oil or gas from his leased property, provided the drilling
of such offset wells will be profitable.5 4
The covenant described above has never been implied in Canada. Almost
every private lease in use in Canada contains an express provision concern-
ing offset wells. 5  The provision typically provides that, within six months
after regular commercial production has been obtained from a well drilled
on any spacing unit not owned by the lessor which laterally adjoins the
leased lands, the lessee must either drill an offset well, surrender such part
of the leased premises where an offset well can be drilled or surrender all
formations other than the one the neighboring well is using and from which
the lessee is obtaining production.56 The express clause imposes obligations
on the lessee less burdensome than might otherwise be implied. The obliga-
54. E. BnowN, 2 Trm LAW OF OIL ANrD GAS LEASES § 16.02 (1958).
55. The only two exceptions in company practice were the lease forms
employed by Home Oil Company Ltd. and Texaco Exploration Canada Ltd. in
Ontario. Both forms contain an exclusion clause which seeks to exclude implied
covenants.
56. A typical provision is as follows:
OFFSET WELLS:
In the event of commercial production being obtained from any well
drilled on any spacing unit laterally adjoining the said lands and not
owned by the lessor, or, if owned by the lessor, not under lease to the
lessee, then unless a well has been or is being drilled on the spacing unit
of the said lands laterally adjoining the said spacing unit on which pro-
duction is being so obtained and to the horizon in the formation from
which production is being so obtained, the lessee shall, within six (6)
months from the date of said well being placed on regular production,
do one of the following:
(a) Commence or cause to be commenced within the six (6) month
period aforesaid operations for the drilling of an offset well on the
spacing unit of the said lands laterally adjoining the said spacing
unit on which production is being so obtained, and thereafter drill
the same to the horizon in the formation from which production is
being obtained from the said adjoining spacing unit; or(b) Surrender all or any portion of the said lands pursuant to the pro-
visions of paragraph 12 hereof, provided that the lands surrendered
shall include that portion of the said lands comprised in the said
[Vol. 39
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tion to drill is solely dependent on the obtaining of commercial production
from the adjoining well. Drainage in other circumstances does not require
the drilling of an offset well. The offset well obligation arises, however,
regardless of the profitability of the drilling of the offset well.
A clause that was the subject of litigation in Crommie v. California
Standard Co.57 provided that the obligation to drill an offset well arose
only upon commercial production of petroleum from a well within "660
feet of an exterior boundary." No obligation to drill arose upon commercial
production of gas from an adjoining property. It was contended that the
clause was "grossly unfair, improvident and unconscionable." The Alberta
Supreme Court rejected the contention and in doing so emphasized the
traditional limitations of the equitable doctrine of constructive fraud in the
obtaining of an unconscionable bargain. The doctrine demands proof of
inequality in the positions of the parties arising from ignorance, need or
distress of the weaker.58 The case indicates that the express clauses will be
maintained unless they severely derogate from obligations that might other-
wise be implied.
Consideration by the Canadian judiciary of the implied covenant to
protect leased premises against drainage by wells drilled on adjoining lands
is confined to Farmers Mutual Petroleum Ltd. v. United States Smelting
Refining and Mining Co.59 The lease provided:
The company shall use reasonable diligence to protect any tracts
covered hereby from drainage by reason of commercial wells pro-
ducing on land not included in the tracts ... and in meeting the
provisions of this covenant shall and may be governed by good oil
field practices and by the requirements of the statutes ....
Chief Justice Bence appeared to accept the defendant's contention that the
clause "merely expressed what would have been implied in any event." The
learned Chief Justice then examined the ambit of the duty imposed by the
implied covenant in the United States and concluded:
spacing unit laterally adjoining the said spacing unit on which pro-
duction is being so obtained; or(c) Where production is being obtained from the said lands from a
formation other than the formation from which commercial produc-
tion is being obtained on the spacing unit laterally adjoining the
said lands, surrender all formations which lie within the said lands
from which the lessee is obtaining production.
PROVIDED, that if such well drilled on lands laterally adjoining
the said lands is productive primarily of only of natural gas, the
lessee shall not be obligated either to drill an offset well or to sur-
render said spacing unit unless and until an adequate and commer-
cially profitable market for natural gas which might be produced
from the offset well can be previously arranged and provided.
57. [1962] 88 W.W.R. 447 (Alta. S.C.) (affirmed.without written reasons
on appeal to C.A. and to S.C.C. April 25, 1962).
58. Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1966] 55 D.L.R. 2d 710, 718 (1965).
59. [1962] 89 W.W.R. 682 (Sask. Q.B.).
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[The clause] does not require the defendants to drill for such pur-
pose unless by so doing there is a reasonable possibility of obtaining
oil in commercial quantities from such drilling.
It seems to be an absurd requirement that the defendants should
drill on a parcel just because there may be some recoverable oil in
place no matter how little .... It would mean that the defendants
might be continually drilling for the benefit of the plaintiff and
with a loss to themselves.60
The implied covenant to protect the leased premises against drainage
by wells drilled on adjoining lands is less significant in Canada than it was
in the United States in the days before conservation legislation. Canada's
prorationing legislation precludes unrestrained production that might other-
wise drain a reservoir swiftly and effectively.
4. Express Attempts to Preclude Implied Covenants:
Exclusion Clauses
a. Private Leases
The use of express provision in Canadian private leases exempts the
lessee from liability for breach of obligations which would otherwise be
imposed by an implied covenant. Areas remain, however, in which Canadian
draftsmen have been reluctant to venture, for example, additional develop-
ment after the obtaining of paying production, and marketing.61 In these
areas as in oil and gas leases in general, the major obstacle to the develop-
ment of a body of Canadian jurisprudence corresponding to the United
States doctrine of implied covenants is the widespread use of exclusion
clauses.
Inquiry into practice in the Canadian oil and gas industry revealed the
widespread use of clauses that seek to preclude the implication of implied
covenants. Such a clause is that of Home Oil Company:62
The parties hereto agree that they have expressed herein their entire
understanding and agreement concerning the subject matter of this
lease and grant and it is expressly agreed that no implied covenant,
condition, term or reservation shall be read into this lease and grant
relating to or concerning the subject matter hereof or any matter
or operation provided for herein.
In 1951, Merrill 63 described such clauses as being comparatively rare in the
United States, being found in only a few forms in use in California, Ohio
60. Id. at 689.
61. As Merrill commented, "[T]he industry is notoriously subject to vicis-
situdes of production and of price which render it well nigh impossible to enter
into specific agreements as to future operation and development". M. MERRUL,
CovENANTS IN(PLIED IN OIL AND GAs LEAsEs 19 (1940).
62. Similar clauses are found in the lease forms employed by Amoco,
B.PO.G., Gulf Oil, Hudson's Bay Company, Husky Oil, Marathon Oil, Mobil Oil,
Petrofina and Sun Oil.63. Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants, 2ND ANN. INST. ON
OIL AND GAs LAW AND TAx Anom 147 (1951).
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and Texas. Both Merrill 64 and Williams 65 have acknowledged the willing-
ness of the courts in the United States to give effect to such provisions.
Such efficacy is, of course, subject to a construction that would not "tend
to prevent the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lease was made,
that is, the production of oil and gas with payment of royalty to the lessor."6
The doctrine of "fundamental breach" in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence
imposes a similar limitation on the efficacy of an exclusion clause. Lord
Hodson described the doctrine in Suisse Atlantique Societe v. N.V. Rotter-
damsche Kolen Centrale,67 to the effect that there is a strong, though
rebuttable, presumption that exclusion clauses were not intended by the
parties to excuse breaches of the fundamental terms of the contract. No
precise formula has emerged for the determination of a fundamental breach.
Phrases such as "an event going to the root of the contract" are conven-
tionally employed. The doctrine may well deny efficacy to the exclusion
clauses presently employed in the Canadian oil and gas industry where
there is a sufficiently serious breach of an implied covenant.
Merrill 8 points out that exclusion clauses are strictly construed in the
United States. To similar effect is the contra proferentem rule of Anglo-
Canadian jurisprudence.69 Merrill further contends:
While the parties should be free to contract to limit or exclude the
operation of the implied covenants, the bare phraseology of the
lease should not be accepted as establishing that they have done so.
There should be clear proof that the clause actually was called
to the lessor's attention, that its effect was explained to him,
that he assented freely and willingly without undue compulsion
or persuasion.70
It has long been established that actual knowledge is not material to the
determination of assent, and in particular that a person who signs a con-
64. M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 434 (1940).
65. H. WILLIAMS, 4 On. AND GAS LAw § 671.1 (1959).
66. Cowden v. Broderick & Calvert, Inc., 131 Tex. 434, 114 S.W.2d 1166
(1938).
67. [1966] 2 All E.R. 61, 89 (H.L.).
[W]here there is a breach of a fundamental term . . . there is a
strong, though rebuttable presumption that, in inserting a clause of
exclusion or limitation in their contract, the parties are not contemplating
breaches of fundamental terms and such clauses do not apply to relieve
a party from the consequences of such a breach even where the contract
continues in force. This result has been achieved by a robust use of a
well-known canon of construction, that wide words which taken in isola-
tion would bear one meaning must be so construed as to give business
efficacy to the contract and the presumed intention of the parties,
on the footing that both parties are intending to carry out the contract
fundamentally.
Id. at 89.
68. M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 431 (1940).
69. Wallis v. Pratt & Haynes, [1911] A.C. 394; Andrews v. Singer, [1934]
1 K.B. 17 (C.A.).
70. M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 437 (1940).
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tractual document is bound by its terms even though he has not read them. 1
The approach advocated by Merrill is not available to restrict the operation
of exclusion clauses in Canadian private oil and gas leases.
b. Crown Leases
[T~he major Alberta producers are lessees and obliged to meet the
conditions established by the Government .... 72
Oil and gas production in Canada occurs predominantly in the Western
provinces. Percentages of Canada's oil and gas production in 1970 were
as follows: 73
Oil Gas
Alberta 75.3 percent 72.9 percent
Saskatchewan 17.8 percent 19.0 percent
British Columbia 5.4 percent 5.7 percent
Manitoba 1.4 percent 1.4 percent
Significant areas in terms of oil and gas potential are areas under federal
jurisdiction in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, the Arctic Islands and
offshore the East Coast.
All land in Canada was originally owned by the Crown. The Crown
transferred land ownership to homesteaders as they moved from east to
west. After 1889, these land transfers were subject to a reservation of mines
and minerals to the Crown. The result today is that Crown ownership of
mineral rights increases drastically as one moves west into areas of settle-
ment after 1889. In those areas of Manitoba suitable to oil and gas produc-
tion, 15 percent of mineral rights are held by the Crown, in Saskatchewan
70 percent, in Alberta 90 percent, and 99 percent in northeast British
Columbia. In the areas of federal jurisdiction, the Crown owns almost 100
percent of mineral rights.
Production of oil and gas of which the Crown owns the mineral rights
is conducted on the terms set down by the Crown. The lessee's bargaining
position is such that it must either conduct its operations on those terms or
not at all. The terms of the lease are set forth in legislation such as the
Alberta Mines and Minerals Act.74 The nature of the lessee's obligation is
not merely that of economic subjugation to terms. The Crown is also the
law-making body. This aspect of the lessor-lessee relationship is recognized
by clauses that clearly incorporate subsequent laws into the lease.75 These
71. L'Estrange v. Graucob, [1984] 2 K.B. 894 (Div. Ct.).
72. Per Premier Lougheed of Alberta, Star-Phoenix, Saskatoon, February
28, 1974.
78. Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book (1972).
74. R.S.A. 1970 c. 288 (1970).
75. The Alberta Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease (1972) provides:
The lessee shall comply with the provisions of the Mines and Minerals
Act and any Act passed in substitution therefor, and any regulations that
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clauses provide what Thompson described as a "legal mechanism for con-
trolling oil agreements so that the relationship between the government and
the oil company can be made responsive to change which the public interest
dictates."70
Under the Alberta Mines and Minerals Act, an oil and gas lease is
granted for a ten-year term, subject to continuation upon the drilling of a
producing well.77 Section 125.1 provides:
(1) ... a lessee shall commence drilling operations on the location
within one year from the date the Minister gives notice requir-
ing him to do so and the lessee shall continue such drilling
operations . . . with a view to the discovery of petroleum or
natural gas.
(2) The notice referred to in subsection (1) shall not be given in
respect of any lease
(a) that has in the location a producing well ....
(3) The notice referred to in subsection (1) may be given to the
lessee as to any lease that has reached the end of the 10th year
of its term ....
The provision excludes any possibility of implying a covenant to drill an
exploratory well. The terms of section 164 are obviously more advantageous
to the Crown than might be the implication of such a covenant.
The implied covenant to protect the leased premises against drainage
by wells drilled on adjoining lands is denied by section 134.
(1) In this section... 'freehold well' means a well that produces
petroleum or natural gas from a spacing unit, the petroleum or
natural gas in which is not owned by the Crown in the right
of Alberta.
(2) In the event of petroleum being produced from a freehold
well in a spacing unit directly offsetting a location, the lessee
shall, within a period of 90 days of the date of such well coming
into production commence the drilling of a well on the location
to offset the freehold well and shall drill the same continu-
ously and diligently to the strata from which the petroleum is
produced.
at any time may be made under the authority of the said Acts, and all
such provisions and regulations that prescribe, relate to or affect the
rights and obligations of lessees of petroleum and natural gas rights, the
property of the Crown shall be deemed to be incorporated into this lease
and shall bind the lessee in the same manner and to the same extent as if
the same were set out herein and covenants on the part of the lessee.
Each and every provision or regulation hereafter made shall be deemed
to be incorporated into this lease and shall bind the lessee as and from
the date it comes into force, but in the event of conflict between any
regulation hereafter made and any regulation previously made the regula-
tion last made shall prevail.
76. Thompson, Sovereignty and Natural Resources-A Study of Canadian
Petroleum Legislation, 4 U.B.C. L. Rtv. 161, 166 (1969).
77. R.S.A. c. 238, § 126 (1970).
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Diligent and proper operation of wells is also secured by express covenants.7 8
Legislation does not, however, impose lease provisions concerning the
lessee's duty to market the product or to conduct additional development
after paying production is obtained.
It has been remarked in the United States that "the [United States]
Government is not content to rely upon implied covenants'7 9 in the develop-
ment of oil and gas production. After examining the terms imposed by the
Crown as lessor in federal jurisdiction oil and gas leases, this comment also
seems appropriate to the Canadian situation. The Canada Oil and Gas Land
Regulations 0 provide that oil and gas leases shall be granted for a term of
21 years, subject to renewal if "capable of producing oil and gas."8 ' Section
89 provides:
The Minister may at any time, except during the three years next
following the issue of a lease, order the lessee to commence and
continue the drilling of a well to the satisfaction of the Minister
within 90 days from the date of the order.
Section 94 provides:
Where a lessee is producing oil or gas in commercial quantity, the
Chief may order the lessee to drill further wells on the lease area
and to continue producing oil or gas so long as that area continues
to yield oil or gas in commercial quantity.
Such provisions suggest a very limited reliance by the Crown upon the
doctrine of implied obligations to protect its interest as lessor.
Provincial Crown leases, on the other hand, contain the following curi-
ous provision:
No implied covenant or liability of any kind on Her Majesty's part
is created by the use of the words 'lessee' or "lease herein, or by
the use of any other word or words herein, or shall otherwise arise
by reason of the lease or anything herein contained.
Whatever reliance on the doctrine of implied covenants the Crown would
prefer to render unnecessary on its part, it seeks to ensure that no reliance
78. The Alberta Crown Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease provides:
The lessee shall comply with the provisions of The Oil and Gas Con-
servation Act, and The Gas Resources Preservation Act, and any Act or
Acts passed in substitution for them or either of them, and any order of
the Energy Resources Conservation Board made pursuant to any of such
Acts, and any regulations that at any time may be made under the au-
thority of any of such Acts, and all such provisions, orders and regula-
tions shall bind the lessee in the same manner and to the same extent
as if the same were set out herein as covenants on the part of the lessee.
Each and every provision, order or regulation hereafter made shall be
deemed to be incorporated into this lease and shall bind the lessee as and
from the date it comes into force, but in the event of conflict between
any order or regulation hereafter made and any order or regulation pre-
viously made the order or regulation last made shall prevail.
79. Malone, Oil and Gas Leases on United States Government Lands, 2ND
ANN, INST. ON OIL AND GAs LAw AND TAXATION 309, 339 (1951).
80. S.O.R.161-253 Under Territorial Lands Act R.S.C. 1970 C.T. 6 and
Public Land Grants Act R.S.C. 1970 c. P-29.
81. Id. at §§ 62-63.
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is available to a lessee. The significance of the doctrine of implied covenants
in the protection of the lessor's interest is markedly reduced by this device.
The doctrine, however, is not wholly insignificant as the Crown's discretion
as law-maker is not, of course, unlimited. The limitations were indicated by
the Hon. N.E. Turner, Minister of Lands and Mines for the Province of
Alberta in 1949:
Those charged with the development of the mineral resources as
trustees for the people of the Province find themselves in the posi-
tion where they must at all times be fair and just both to the people
and to those persons who risk their money in providing the means
whereby the resources are developed. In the very nature of things,
there could not be prolonged failure in the discharge of that trust.8 2
The doctrine of implied covenants is founded upon the parties' contractual
intention. Reliance by the lessor upon such doctrine does not appear "unfair
or unjust."
V. TBE ImPLIED CoVENANT rO CoNDucT ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT AFTE
PAY NG PRODUCrON Is OBTAINED
A leading United States authority has commented:
Absent from most lease forms are covenants relating to development
and further exploration, and hence it seems probable that Canadian
courts will in time be led to find implied obligations of the lessee
in these connections.8
It still remains an open question as to when a Canadian court will
imply a covenant for additional development in an oil and gas lease.
The vagaries of the oil and gas business make it impossible to cate-
gorically state in a lease how many wells should be drilled, or what strata
should be explored in a given tract of land. While it is true that modern
techniques for surveying subterranean strata are more accurate in determin-
ing possible oil and gas deposits, 8 4 it is still as much a truism today as when
it was first uttered that "oil is where you find it." It is these uncertainties
that have contributed to the absence of express covenants to further develop
and explore in oil and gas leases.
A. In the United States
In the United States there has been considerable controversy concern-
ing implied covenants to conduct additional development and exploration
after paying production has been obtained. It is not intended, in this article,
to become embroiled in the debate, but merely to examine the propositions
advanced and to consider how they might be applied in Canada.
82. Turner, The Oil and Gas Law of the Province of Alberta, Canada, 1ST.
ANN. INST. ON On. Am GAS LAw AND TAXATiON 818, 820 (1949).
83. Williams, Comments on Oil and Gas Jurisprudence in Canada and the
United States, 4 ALTA. L. REv. 189, 194 (1965-66).
84. See Am. Petroleum Institute, History of Petroleum Engineering, (1961).
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Williams and Meyers85 see the lessee's obligations as falling into two
categories: (1) The covenant of reasonable development, and (2) The
covenant of further exploration. They expand on this classification as
follows: s0
The reasonable development covenant is concerned with additional
drilling in a proven field. The further exploration covenant is con-
cerned with additional drilling in potentially productive strata that
are yet unproven. Breach of the reasonable development covenant
causes loss to the lessor by depriving him of the use of capital repre-
sented by minerals remaining in the ground that ought to have
been produced. Breach of the further exploration covenant deprives
lessor of the opportunity of having his land tested for new produc-
ing horizons.
It is beyond dispute that United States courts8s have consistently implied
a covenant to continue development with reasonable diligence until a suffi-
cient number of wells have been drilled to reasonably develop the property.
The major qualification to this covenant is that the lessor must show that
production from the additional wells would yield a reasonable profit. In
other words, the question to be asked is, "What in the circumstances would
a reasonably prudent operator do?" In Becker v. Submarine Oil Co. 8 the
test was put in these words:
The lessee has a right to regard his own interest as well as that of
the lessor. In short, the dilligence of the lessee involves such a
course of conduct upon his part as operators of ordinary diligence
would pursue having in mind the securing of the financial benefits
sought by both lessor and lessee.89
It is with regard to the existence of an implied covenant of future
exploration that the controversy has arisen. Meyers first articulated the
view that the United States courts ° had implicitly developed a covenant to
use due diligence to explore further, untested portions of leased lands.91
This covenant was to be implied whether or not there was any reasonable
expectation of profit from the enterprise. This publication lit the fuse for
the academic debate that followed.9 2 The Supreme Court of Texas height-
85. 5 H. WILLLA4s & C. MENERS, OM AND GAS LAw 258 (1972).
86. Id. at 258-59.
87. For a list of such decisions, see E. BnowN, 2 Thm LAw or OiL AND GAs
LEASES § 16.02 (1973).
88. 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 P. 245 (1921).
89. Id. at 703, 204 P. at 247.
90. See, e.g., Sauder v. Mid-Continent Pet. Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
91. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TExAs L. REV.
553 (1956).
92. See E. BnowN, 2 Tim LAw OF On AN) GAS LEASES § 16.05 (1973);
Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment,
37 TEXAs L. REV. 303 (1959); Brown, The Implied Covenant for Additional
Development, 13 S.W.L.J. 149 (1959); Endom, Implied Covenants of Explora-
tion in Oil and Gas Leases, 37 TIn.. L. REV. 90 (1962); Merrill, The Implied
Covenant for Further Exploration, 4 Rocx'Y MT. MNEmRAL L. INST. 205 (1958);
Meyers, Two Drilling Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, 38 MwN. L.
1REV. 127, 141 (1954); Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration: A Corn-
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ened 93 the issue in Clifton v. Koontz.94 Koontz rejected the argument that
there is an implied covenant to explore which is separate and distinguishable
from the implied covenant to conduct additional development after produc-
tion is obtained.95 Because there was no implied covenant to explore, the
lessees had no obligation to drill additional wells where there was no
expectation that the additional wells would yield a profit.96
The interpretations of Koontz are as varied as there are opinions as to
the existence of the implied obligation to further develop. Meyers and Wil-
liams interpret the case in this way: 97
It thus appears then an exploration obligation may exist in Texas
law but that it must not be labeled as a covenant to explore further.
Rather, the duty should be denominated as an implied covenant
to reasonably develop, governed by the prudent operator standard,
but not subject to the requirement of proof of production in paying
quantities ....
Another writer in countering this contention has stated: 98
As do many other Texas lawyers I believe that the Supreme Court
of Texas, in Clifton v. Koontz, held squarely that there is no implied
covenant for further exploration appurtenant to an oil and gas
lease, as distinguished from the existing implied covenant for
development.
This debate does not appear to have been resolved in the United States.
B. In Canada
The United States controversy over the implied covenant to explore
and the attendant discussion of all points of view indicate that there is a
basis on which Canadian courts might intervene on behalf of the lessor. It
is submitted that the following possibilities should be considered in Canada
with regard to the implied covenant to further develop and explore the
leased premises: 99 (1) The obligation to explore for and develop minerals
ment, 37 TExAs L. l~v. 179 (1958); Meyers, The Effect on Implied Covenants
of Conservation Laws and Practices, 4 Roc-y MT. MINEnAL L. INST. 463 (1958);
Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Devel-
opments, 41 TExAs L. REv. 789 (1968).
93. See Merrill, Sinclair-Masterson: A Study in the Role of Federal Courts
in Applying State Law, 14 OxLaA. L. REv. 1 (1961).
94. 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (Tex. 1959). Further fuel was added by
the cases of Sinclair Oil and Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960) and Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Pet. Corp.
834 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1960).
95. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 98, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959).
96. Id. at 98, 325 S.W.2d at 697.
97. Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas
Developments, 41 TExAs L. REv. 789, 798 (1963).
98. Smith, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments
-A Disagreement, 42 TExAs L. REv. 199 (1963).
99. These obligations might be fulfilled by express covenants in the lease.
For instance the offset well obligation may necessitate the drilling of additional
wells or existing wells to lower horizons in order to prevent drainage.
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other than oil and gas; (2) the obligation to drill and explore to lower
horizons; and (3) the obligation to drill further producing wells where
there is already production.
1. Private Canadian Leases
An examination of current Canadian private leases shows that the
covenant to conduct additional development is one which is not generally
expressed. It would appear therefore, that such leases would provide fertile
ground for the implication of a covenant to further develop and explore.
Notwithstanding this situation, no such covenant has yet become a part
of Canadian oil and gas jurisprudence. The explanation is suggested to be
a lack of appropriate litigation rather than judicial antipathy.
a. The Obligation to Explore For and Develop Other Minerals
Merrill in discussing this possible obligation frames it in this way: 100
A variant of the problem as to exploring other strata arises in con-
nection with leases which by their terms extend to more than one
mineral. While production of any one of the substances covered
by such a lease may be adequate to preserve the leasehold where it
is specified that it shall continue so long as any of the minerals are
produced, do not the implied covenant obligations require explora-
tion within a reasonable time for each mineral embraced within its
terms, at least wherever there is reasonable cause to infer that the
substance might be found on the premises? What authority exists
seems to point in this direction.
The private oil and gas lease in Canada provides considerable scope
for the implication of this obligation. The granting clause of the lease deter-
mines which mineral rights have been granted to the lessee. The Chevron
Standard granting clause is typical of granting clauses employed by Cana-
dian industry. Under this clause the lessor disposes of:
All of the petroleum, natural gas (including but not limited to all
hydrocarbon gas, hydrogen sulphide and helium) and related
hydrocarbons other than coal, and all other gases and all minerals
and substances (whether liquid or solid and whether hydrocarbons
or not) found or produced in association with any of the foregoing
or in any water contained in any reservoir containing petroleum,
natural gas and related hydrocarbons ....
It is submitted that a clause of this kind will not impose any obligation on
the lessee to search for other minerals once he has achieved production of
oil or gas. The very wording of the clause restricts the lessee's right to only
those other minerals found or produced in association with oil and gas.
The granting clause employed by Shell Oil (Canada) Ltd., on the other
hand, is more likely to give rise to the implied obligation that Merrill sug-
gests exists. Under this clause the lessor grants to the lessee:
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All of the said lands for the purpose and with the exclusive right of
exploring, drilling, mining, operating for, producing, winning, tak-
ing, removing, storing, treating, processing and disposing of petro-
leum and natural gas, and all related hydrocarbons and all other
minerals comprised in the lessor's title hereinbefore referred to,
(hereinafter called "the leased substances") within upon or under
the said lands .... 101
This clause clearly goes beyond the one previously examined. it appears to
be an outright grant of all minerals to the lessee. The lessee's right to such
minerals is not restricted to the situation where they are produced in con-
junction with oil and gas. The nature of the grant provided to the lessee is
reinforced by the royalties clause which specifically provides for a fixed
royalty on sulphur produced and a 10 percent royalty on all (except oil and
gas) other minerals produced. Under this type of clause there is no doubt
that the lessor could not give a mineral lease to a third party, for, say, coal,
because he has already granted same to the lessee. This clause gives the
lessee a valuable right.10 2 Coextensive with this interest, however, is the
lessee's obligation to explore for and develop all minerals contained in his
grant. To hold otherwise would frustrate the intention of the parties as
expressed in the lease.
The policy behind this implied covenant is to prevent the lessee from
nominally satisfying the terms of the. lease by paying a small royalty from
the working of one mineral without searching for other minerals that may
be equally important substances. 0 3 The covenant, however, might well leave
many lessees in a quandry, particularly those that have drafted a lease to
specifically include as many minerals as possible. One Canadian writer has
suggested the problem could be solved by making the lease severable with
regard to the minerals included and the particular formations:
In this way, a company producing, say, oil from a spacing unit of
one legal subdivision where the lease covers oil and gas in a full
section might be in breach of the implied covenant insofar as other
substances and other formations are concerned, but would not be
in default insofar as the producing area is concerned. 10 4
This approach might be a valid method of dealing with existing leases
that cover all minerals. It is suggested, however, that lessees in the future
will have to be careful in drafting the granting clause. If they take a com-
plete mineral lease they may find themselves saddled with the obligation to
develop minerals other than oil and gas.
101. Emphasis added.
102. This is particularly so in the Province of Saskatchewan where substantial
deposits of potash have been discovered.
103. See Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Price v.
Nicholas, 19 F. Cas. 1320 (No. 11, 415) (C.C.W.D. Va. 1878).
104. Dea, A Look at the Lease From the Lessor's Point of View, 4 ArTA. L.
REv. 208, 211 (1965/66).
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b. The Obligation to Drill and Explore to Lower Horizons'0 5
Given the dispute over this covenant in the United States'06 and Cana-
dian legislation regulating drilling and production, it appears that there is
little likelihood of the obligation to drill and explore to lower horizons being
litigated in Canada. At the most basic level, it is unlikely that the fact
situations which prompted the leading United States cases in this area will
arise under the private lease in Canada.
Most private leases in Canada, for historical reasons, cover only small
tracts of land ranging from 160 to 640 acres. Clifton v. Koontz,107 the leading
case dealing with the covenant to drill and explore to lower horizons,
involved a relatively small tract comparable to the majority of private
Canadian holdings.' 08 In refusing to imply the covenant, the court pointed
out that the case was not one in which the "lease covers several thousand
acres and an effort is being made to hold such vast acreage by showing
production from a comparatively small area."10 9 It is precisely into the
Koontz situation that most Canadian private leases would fall. Canada sim-
ply does not have the large private tracts which are capable of being tied
up by production from a small area. Consequently, there appears to be no
real basis, in Canada, on which a covenant to explore further and drill to
lower horizons could be implied.
c. The Obligation to Drill Further Producing Wells Where There
Is Already Production
The nature of this obligation has been put succintly in these words:
[U]pon securing production of oil or gas from the leasehold, the
lessee is bound thereafter .. .to develop the premises as a rea-
sonably prudent operator ...would drill under similar circum-
stances.1 0
The rationale for such an implied covenant exists in the notion of what do
the parties "reasonably expect" from the lease. Where the lessor is paid a
royalty on production, it has been said that it would be "unjust, unreasonable,
105. Lower horizons refers to the fact that oil and gas can be found at vary-
ing depts in stratified layers. A lessee may drill and find gas, yet if he were to
drill deeper to a lower horizon, he may find oil. The problem is to determine
whether drilling to one producing horizon is sufficient to satisfy the terms of
any lease.
106. It would appear that the more controversial a United States decision is,
the less likely it will be followed by a Canadian court as a precedent.
107. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
108. Id. at 688 (350 acres).
109. Id. at 696. But of. Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Pet. Corp., 334 S.W.2d
449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (no implied covenant to explore in two leases cover-
ing a total of 19,010 acres).
110. H. WILLAM-S & C. MEYERS, 5 Om "D GAS LAw 832 at 215 (1972).
See also E. BnowN, 2 Trm LAw OF OIL AND GAS § 16.02 (1973); M. MERRILL,
2 COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GA LEASES 154 (1940); W. Sxmnilmms, 2 OIL
AND GAS, § 398 (1959).
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and countervene the nature and spirit of the lease, to allow the lessee to
continue to hold his term for a reasonable length of time, without making
any effort to work the mine."111
This implied covenant, as applied in the United States, is subject to
several qualifications: (1) It only arises after production has been ob-
tained;112 (2) the lessor must show that additional development wells will
produce oil and gas in "paying quantities";"13 and (3) the test for "paying
quantities" is whether sufficient oil and gas will be produced from the
additional well so as to allow the lessee to make a reasonable profit over
and above his capital and operating expenses.14
The application of these criteria will ultimately depend on the facts of
each particular case. This makes it impossible to categorically state in what
circumstances such an obligation will be implied. The reason advanced for
the dearth of judicial intervention under this head in Canada is that conser-
vation legislation has strictly regulated the number of wells that can be
drilled or produced from in any tract."15 The oil and gas conservation legis-
lation in the three Western Canadian provinces specifically states that one
of the functions of the legislation is to secure safe and efficient practices in
the location and spacing of wells."16
Conservation legislation has been primarily directed at oil and gas well
spacing, pooling and unitization. Wells can only be drilled pursuant to a
license and in the area specified. 1 7 The normal minimum drilling spacing
unit for an oil well is one well per 160 acres; for a gas well, the normal unit
is one well per 640 acres."18 Generally, the drilling spacing unit will become
the production spacing unit. Special spacing units may be prescribed by
the oil and gas conservation boards, and the normal unit can be reduced if
certain criteria are satisfied." 9
111. George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 164, 95 N.W.2d 609, 617 (Neb. 1959).
Although this case involved a gravel mine its comments can be validly extrapolated
to cover any type of mineral lease.
112. See Fischer v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 156 1 Can. 367 (1948).
118. See Hayes v. Southwest Nat. Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1941).
114. See Myers v. Shell Petroleum Co., 153 1 Can. 287 (1941).
115. See J. BALLEM, THE Om AND GAS LEASE IN CANADA 182 (1973).
116. See Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 267 § 5(b) (Alberta);
Petroleum and Natural Gas Act of Mar. 26, 1965 Stat. B.C. 199, 206, c. 33 §§ 18,
42 (under definition of wasteful operations) (British Columbia; Oil and Gas Con-
servation Act R.S.S. 1965 c. 360 § 3(b) (Saskatchewan).
117. See Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 267 § 23 (Alberta);
Petroleum and Natural Gas Act Stat. of Mar. 26, 1965, B.C. 199, 206, c. 33 §§ 18,
42 (British Columbia); Oil and Gas Conservation Act R.S.S. 1965 c. 360 § 8
(Saskatchewan).
118. See Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations Alta. Reg. 151/71 Regulation
4.020(1) (3) (Alberta); Drilling and Production Regulations B.C. Reg. 60/69
Regulations 11.01, 12.01, 13.01 (British Columbia); Spacing Regulations O.C.
713/166; Sask. Reg. 186/74; 167/64 (Saskatchewan).
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These spacing units obviously created difficulties for the owners of
small tracts. The method traditionally used to avoid this problem was to
combine several small tracts to make a drilling unit. Most Canadian oil and
gas leases contain a clause whereby the lessee may
pool or combine the said lands, or any portion thereof, or any zone
or formation underlying the said lands or any portion thereof, with
any other lands or any zone or formation underlying the same,
but so that the lands so pooled and combined ... shall not exceed
one (1) spacing unit as hereinbefore defined.120
Petroleum, in situ, does not conform to surface property lines. Unitiza-
tion':" therefore developed as a method to form a common production unit
covering large field-wide or pool-wide areas. The advantage of this system
is that the pool can be effectively developed without drilling unnecessary
wells. The interests of the mineral owners are recognized in the "tract for-
mula" which allocates production from the unit.
A lessee wanting to bring a tract into a unit agreement will normally
require the further consent of the lessor, rather than relying on the pooling
clause in his lease. Some Canadian oil and gas leases, however, have in-
serted an express unitization clause: 22
The lessee is hereby given the right and power to unitize the said
lands or any portion or portions thereof with any other lands in the
vicinity of the said lands whether the said lands be now or here-
under grant or lease to the lessee to the end that all lands so uni-
tized shall be jointly developed as an entirety.
This clause appears in a lease used in the Province of Saskatchewan.
That Province has a provision for both compulsory 23 and voluntary 24 uniti-
zation. Other provinces, notably Alberta, 25 rely on voluntary unitization
with the threat of compulsory unitization if agreement cannot be reached.
26
Recognizing that conservation legislation regulates the Canadian indus-
try with regard to operations carried on after production is obtained, the
problem remains to determine the extent implied covenants to drill further
wells are obviated by such legislation. The position in the United States is
unclear. Certain authors believe there is no scope for an implied covenant
to further develop in a pooled or unitized field.127 Other authors feel the
120. Sun Oil Co. Lease Clause 9.
121. For a full discussion of unitization, see C. MEYEiis, T iLA W OF POOLING
AND UMTIzATION (1957).
122. Gulf Oil Ltd. (Saskatchewan) Lease.
128. Oil and Gas Conservation Act Rev. Stat. Sask. c. 360 §§ 34-43 (1965).
124. Id. §§ 30(1), 43(a).
125. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Stat. Alta. 1969 c. 88 §§ 87-95 (1969).
This Act has provisions for compulsory unitization but they have not been pro-
claimed to be in force.
126. For a discussion as to the merits of compulsory versus voluntary unitiza-
tion, see Hardwicke, Unitization Statutes: Voluntary Action or Compulsion, 24
RocKY MT. L. REV. 29 (1951).
127. See Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Cov-
enants in Oil and Gas Leases, 4 Ox.. L. REv. 337, 362 (1951); Siefldn, Effect
of Proration on Implied Covenants, 19 OKLA. B.A.J. 1652, 1656 (1948).
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implied covenant to develop lives on in the face of conservation legislation,128
even though the obligation relates to the unitized area and not a specific
tract. In Canada, the policy underlying the conservation legislation does not
preclude implied covenants for further development. Conservation legisla-
tion exists to promote conservation, not necessarily to prevent further devel-
opment. In discussing the "compliance with laws clause" commonly found
in Canadian gas and oil leases, 129 it was suggested that, to excuse perform-
ance, it must be established that the convenanted performance is rendered
impossible by the conservation legislation requirements. Implicit in that
conclusion is the notion that the lessee must still do everything possible to
fulfill his obligations, be they expressed or implied. If such development
within the unit is possible under the law, then the lessee should be obliged
to undertake it. This, after all, is asking the lessee to do no more than fulfill
the reasonable expectation of the parties.
It is one thing to convince a court of the existence of such an obligation
to develop on the part of the lessee. It is a very different thing to secure
the enforcement of that obligation. As a practical matter, the enforcement
of the obligation will be predicated on the lessor having information con-
cerning the strata or the existence of other minerals. It appears unlikely
that a court would enforce such an obligation on the unsubstantiated word
of the lessor. Where can the lessor obtain the necessary evidence? A lessor
may be able to observe operations and production from adjacent tracts and
on this evidence make inferences about his own land. This is, however, a
highly speculative process. The best source of information is, of course, the
lessee. Lessees, however, tend to restrict the amount of information they
give to lessors. This secrecy is presumably to keep such information from
falling into the hands of competitors and other prospective lessors.
A lease drafted by a lessor, will probably demand detailed information
on all aspects of the operations. The lessee's interest in keeping the infor-
mation confidential can be protected by the lessor agreeing not to reveal
the information he has been given. The Pan Canadian Petroleum lease is a
good example of the lessor's lease.130
128. See J. Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations
on Rights of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5
S.W.L.F. 125, 143 (1954); Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitiza-
tion, 2 OKrA. L. REv. 469 (1949); Meyers, The Effect on Implied Covenants of
Conservation Laws and Practices, 4 Rocxv MT. Mn'r. L. LqST. 463 (1958).
129. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
130. Clause 10 provides in part:
(b) During the drilling of each well on the said lands, the lessee shall:
(i) furnish the lessor with written advice of the date of spudding
thereof;
(ii) furnish the lessor with daily drilling reports;(iii) take formation samples at such intervals and at such depths as
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Lessees in drafting leases, on the other hand, generally obligate them-
selves to make available production statistics only. For example, the Gulf
Oil (Canada) lease states, in clause nine:
The lessee shall make available to the lessor during normal business
hours at the lessee's address hereinafter mentioned the lessee's
records relative to the quantity of leased substances produced from
the said lands and sold or allocated to the said lands ....
It would appear that by expressly obligating himself to provide only produc-
tion statistics, the lessee can avoid any liability to deliver further informa-
tion to the lessor. This places the lessor under a lessee's lease in the difficult
position of being "unable to determine whether or not the lessee is perform-
ing the express or implied covenants of the lease when such information is
not made available to him and when he has no way of compelling its
production."' 3 '
While the lessee is obligated to bring most of the needed information
to the attention of the appropriate conservation board, delivery of this infor-
mation to such an agency does not necessarily make it a matter of public
record. This information is delivered to the board for conservation purposes
and not to enable the lessor to use it to compel the lessee to perform express
or implied obligations. One avenue the lessor could explore, however, in
order to obtain information is that of "fiduciary duty." It could be argued
that because operations and information are in the exclusive hands of the
lessee and the lessor has a real interest in what is being done, the lessee has
a fiduciary duty to make such information available to the lessor.
the lessor may prescribe and furnish the lessor with a complete
set of samples, washed and in suitable containers;(iv) furnish the lessor; with chip samples at 2 foot intervals and at
lithologic changes throughout the length of all cores taken;(v) furnish the lessor with immediate advice of any porous zones or
showings of the leased substances;(vi) take representative mud samples and drillstem test fluid samples
in order to obtain accurate resistivity readings of mud filtrate
and formation water and furnish the lessor with all information
relative thereto;(vii) furnish the lessor with two copies of the drill stem test and
service report on each drill stem test run, including copies of
pressure charts;(viii) permit representatives of the lessor to have access to the wellsite
including derrick floor at all reasonable times to inspect and
observe and make records relating to the operations of the lessee.
(f) With respect to each well drilled on the said lands, the lessee shall furnish
the lessor with a copy of all reports required to be filed with such
government body.
(g) Except for information which is available to the public from any gov-
ernmental authority, the lessor, if requested by the lessee, shall treat as
confidential during the term of this lease all or any part of the informa-
tion contained in any reports of the lessee furnished, given or delivered
to the lessor pursuant to this clause 10, provided, however, that this
sub-clause (g) shall not prevent the lessor from divulging any informa-
tion to a subsidiary of the lessor.
181. Dea, A Look at the Lease from the Lessor's Point of View, 4 ALTA. L.
RE.v. 208, 214 (1965).
[Vol. 39
28




Crown leases contain provisions that could be used to make lessees
conduct additional development once paying productionA32 has been ob-
tained. These provisions are contained in the legislation that governs the
lease. Normally, the Crown has discretion to require the drilling of further
wells after production has been obtained. 33 To enforce such a covenant, the
Crown has expressly provided that it shall have access to all the lessee's
records. 3 4 This discretion is not unfettered, however, because Crown leases
are also subject to conservation legislation. Although the effect of conserva-
tion legislation on express and implied covenants has already been discussed,
it should be re-emphasized that conservation legislation will take precedence
over an express covenant.
The realities of the oil and gas business are such that the Crown will
not be in a position to arbitrarily enforce its express covenant for further
development. The Crown will have to be fair and just in dealing with the
lessees if it is to secure development of the leased land for the public's
benefit. Circumstances may arise in the future when the Crown may well
be justified in demanding increased development. It has prepared for this
contingency by the inclusion of the express covenant to further develop.
VI. Tim ImLD CovENANT TO MAPcET Tm PRODUCTION
A. In General
The United States jurisdictions have recognized such an implied cove-
nant: "Generally, even in the absence of an express covenant to produce and
132. Crown leases specifically restrict the grant under the lease to petroleum
and natural gas.
There may be dispute whether a mineral such as helium falls under the
general expression "natural gas." See McCombe, Helium and its Place in the
Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease, 2 ALTA. L. Rlv. 9 (162-64). Saskatchewan
Crown leases, however, specifically reserve helium to the Crown in the following
words:
SAVING AND RESERVING nevertheless unto the lessor the helium in,
from or found combined with, or extractable from, or that may be
obtained out of, the petroleum within or mined
Production under a Crown lease in Saskatchewan will therefore be restricted to
petroleum and natural gas.
183. See, e.g., Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations S.O.R.161-253 Regula-
tion 94.
184. E.g., the Saskatchewan Crown Lease provides, inter alia:
The lessee shall permit the Minister or his authorized agent at the
responsibility, risk and expense of the Minister or his Agent, at any
time and from time to time to enter upon the said lands and into or
upon the office or place where the lessee's books and records are kept,
and inspect and examine the operations of the lessee and the plant,
work, books and records used or kept or having any reference to the
operations, examine samples of minerals and other substances encoun-
tered during the operations, make copies of such books and records or
any part thereof and carry out tests and examinations . ...
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market, there is an implied covenant that the lessee will do so."135 In dealing
with this covenant, the courts examine the lessee's conduct in attempting
to market the products. 30 Resort is then made to the mythical "prudent
operator"137 in deciding whether the lessee has exhibited the necessary due
care and diligence.
Each case will depend on its particular facts, so any formulation of the
conditions in which such a covenant will be implied is speculative. One
authority, however, has suggested the following concerning the covenant:
(1) There is an implied covenant that requires a lessee to market
the production from his lease, including the lessor's roy-
alty, unless the lessor elects to market his own share of the
production.
(2) In marketing the lessor's royalty oil or gas the lessee acts as
agent of the lessor, in accordance with trade usages in the
industry.
(3) The diligence required of the lessee in such marketing is "rea-
sonable diligence" and the time in which the marketing is to
be done is a "reasonable time" under all the facts and circum-
stances of the case.
(4) The price at which such production shall be sold is the reason-
able market value of the product.13 8
No express covenant'3 9 to market appears in current Canadian oil and
gas leases. On the contrary, one particular lease attempts to limit the lessees
obligation to market:
[N] othing herein contained shall obligate lessee to produce, save,
sell or otherwise dispose of any gas from said land unless such gas
well shall be of commercial quality and quantity and a commer-
cially profitable market therefor shall exist at the well when
produced. 40
Most lessors enter into a lease with the expectation that if there is
production of any of the leased substances, they will get royalty payments
on such production. Most royalty clauses, however, do not fulfill that expec-
tation because the royalty is payable only when the products are marketed.
A typical royalty clause reads as follows:
135. Eggleson v. McCasland, 98 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Okla. 1951) (dictum).
136. Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948).
137. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
188. E. BnowN, 2 Tim LAw OF Om. AND GAs LEAsEs § 16.02 (1973).
139. In some states (notably Oklahoma), there has been some confusion as to
termination of the lease under the 'habendum" clause and the implied covenant
to market. See H. WLLiAms & C. MEYErs, 5 Om. Am GAs LAw 395 (1972). The
habendum clause of an oil and gas lease customarily provides that the lease will
continue in full force and effect beyond the primary term so long as substances
are produced from the leased lands. The lease also normally provides that, if
production is frustrated by a lack of market, the lessee is protected againstforfeiture.
140. Husky Oil lease clause 2(b). Although this clause is an attempt to limit
the lessor's imlied obligation to market, it might well be sustained on the basis
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The lessee reserves unto . . . (hereinafter called the "Royalty
Owner") a gross royalty of Twelve and One-Half percent (121M)
of the leased substances produced and marketed'41 from the said
lands.142
In most cases, the lessee will be just as desirous of finding a market for
the product as the lessor. Circumstances can arise, however, in which the
lessee may be unable or unwilling to market the production, and may be
quite content to keep the lease alive by paying a shut in royalty. 43 Such a
royalty will be substantially less than the royalty on production that is
marketed. 14 4 This may prove to be quite unsatisfactory to the lessor. In such
a case the lessor may have grounds to bring an action for breach of the
implied covenant to market the production.
The various aspects of the implied covenant to market will now be con-
sidered in the context of the Canadian leases.
B. Private Leases
1. The Duty to Market Production
There appears to be no reason of policy or law which should prohibit
the implication of such a covenant in Canada. One Canadian writer has
suggested "that the obligation to market is the one major area in which
Canadian courts might be prepared to imply a covenant."145
Most of the problems that have arisen in connection with the implied
covenant to market have been concerned with gas sales. Crude oil sales
are relatively straight-forward. Oil production can be easily stored on the
surface and can be transported to market in a variety of ways. The pricing
provisions in such contracts are straight-forward and based on the price
prevailing in the particular field, for the particular quality of oil as set by
141. Emphasis added.
142. Petrofina Canada Ltd. lease, clause 3.
143. Often a well may be brought into production, but due to the lack of a
market, it may not be economical for the lessee to produce from that well. In order
to keep the lease alive the lessee is entitled to make a payment to the lessor called
a "shut in royalty".
Canadian courts have been uniformly strict in construing the shut in royalty
provisions in oil and gas leases. See Shell Oil v. Gibbard, [1961] S.C.R. 725;
Canadian Superior Oil v. Kanstrup, [1964] 47 D.L.R. 2d 1 (S.C.C.). The recent
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Cull v. Canadian Oil Ltd., 20 D.L.R. 3d
360, may be evidence of a less harsh approach to the interpretation of lease pro-
visions (including the shut in royalty clause).
144. The standard Canadian shut in royalty payment is a sum equal to the
delay rental payment, which in monetary terms is usually $1.00 per acre leased
per year. The normal production royalty payment is 123z percent (or %) of the
proceeds realized by the sale of substances produced. (There are some exceptions
to this general formula, a minimum price might be set for gas or a fixed price for
such incidental minerals as sulphur).
145. J. BALLEm, THE O. AND GAs LP.s iN CANADA 183 (1973).
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the purchaser at the date of delivery.146 Given the present need for crude
oil, its ease of transportation and the pricing system, the marketing of oil
should not be difficult for the lessee.
Gas purchase contracts, on the other hand, have evolved into long and
complicated documents. The reason is that financing and satutory require-
ments demand commitment of a minimum quantity and quality of gas
reserves as a prerequisite for extension of pipelines into a new production
area. The necessity for proven reserves and the long-term nature of the con-
tract are the cause of most of the problems in connection with the implied
obligation to market.
For instance, a lessee may hold leases over several tracts of land. He
may combine these leases in order to establish the necessary gas reserves
for contract purposes, and yet he may only produce the actual volume from
one tract. The result of this is that "[t]he unhappy lessor finds himself in a
position where his reserves help the lessee establish favourable contract
volumes but are not sold, with the result he obtains no royalty."147 This-
problem has already arisen and been dealt with in the United States on
the basis of the implied covenant to market.148 Such a factual situation could
conceivably arise in Canada and should be dealt with on the same basis.
2. The Lessee as Marketing Agent for the Lessor According to Trade Usage
Whether an agency relationship arises depends on the nature of the
contract between the lessor and lessee. It has been suggested that if the
lessor is allowed to take a share of the production in kind, then the oil allo-
cated to him is under his control and he has the obligation to market it.149
This being so, no agency relationship will arise. Few leases in Canada pro-
vide for delivery in kind,1r0 however, so that in the majority of cases the
lessee will be obliged to market any production.
Trade usage may also bear upon the issue of which party pays any
treatment and transportation costs on production that is marketed. In most
146. For example, Imperial Oil Ltd. provides in their crude oil purchase con-
tract that the price to be paid for a barrel of oil "shall be the Purchaser's desig-
nated price for the grade of crude oil delivered fom the field at the time and place
of commencement of each delivery on the opening gauge measurement of such
delivery."
147. J. BALLExM, THE O. AND GAS LEASE IN CANADA 183 (1973).
148. See Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 829 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964). In
this case the lessee produced and marketed proportionately more gas from adjacent
land. The court held the implied covenant had been breached even though more
gas could not be marketed. Damages were assessed on what the lessee should
have produced from the plaintiffs land had he struck a fair balance between the
two leases.
149. See H. Wm Lris & C. MEYEns, 5 Om AND GAS LAw 894 (1972).
150. The Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas Co. lease, clause 8(E), does allow for
a royalty in kind in these terms:
[T]he lessor may from time to time, upon thirty (30) days' notice to'
the lessee, elect to take the gross royalty share of the crude oil produced
and saved from the said lands in kind . ...
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cases, however, the lease will have express stipulations on these points. A
typical lease will state the obligation in this manner:
The lessor's interest in the leased substances, or the royalties pay-
able thereon, shall bear one-eighth of the costs of transportation,
storage off the said lands and other such necessary costs incurred in
delivering the leased substances to market.' 5 '
Where such an express provision is inserted, there is no room to resort to
trade usage.' 52 It thus appears that in Canada there is little likelihood of
implying an obligation on the lessee to prepare the product for market and
to bear such costs.
3. The Duty to Act with Reasonable Diligence and to Market
Production Within a Reasonable Time
It has already been pointed out that the prudent operator test governs
this issue. As each case depends entirely on its own facts, it is impossible to
forecast what amounts to a reasonable time.1'3 This will be something for
the Canadian courts alone to ascertain if they choose to imply a covenant
to market production.
4. The Duty to Get the Best Obtainable Price
The payment of royalties is generally expressed in terms of a percentage
of the "current market value" of the products sold. Crude oil royalties are
generally paid to the lessee on the basis of the posted field price. Payment
of royalties to the lessor based on this price would in most cases 54 satisfy
this aspect of the lessee's obligation to market. As crude oil purchase con-
tracts are determinable on 30 days' notice,155 the ascertainment of the "cur-
rent market value" of the products is a relatively easy process. Gas purchase
151. Sun Oil Co. lease, clause 4(d). Other leases, however, may not be so
precise with regard to treatment costs. The Shell Canada lease, clause 2(b)
states (inter alia):
As royalty the lessee covenants and agrees:
(b) to pay to the lessor on gas and casinghead gas produced from the
said lands (1) when sold by the lessee, one eighth of the amount
realized by the lessee, computed at the mouth of the well.
The expression "computed at the mouth of the well" suggests that the company
takes the price at which the gas was sold and computes it back to the well head
by deducting processing and transportation costs.
152. Various regulatory agencies, such as Oil and Gas Conservation Boards,
are also involved in setting standards for the processing and transportation of the
products. Such standards would also preclude a resort to trade usage.
153. See Bjornson, Boyd, Bredin, Brown, MacWilliam, Problems in Develop-
ment of Leased Lands, 4 ALTA. L. REv. 302, 319 (1965).
154. An exception could arise if the posted field price was less than the market
price for similar crude oil produced. This type of pricing should rarely arise in
view of the governmental regulation of such prices.
155. See Imperial Oil Ltd. Crude Oil Purchase Contract, clause 4 (f):
... this Agreement shall continue from month to month from the date
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contracts, however, are of much longer duration. This makes it extremely
difficult to compute the "current market value" of the production from the
gas field.
A considerable controversy has arisen in connection with long-term
gas purchase contracts and the expressions "market value" and "market
price." This debate has raised two major problems, both of which are
unresolved in Canada: 50 (1) Is there a difference between market value
and market price? (2) At what time is the market value or market price to be
ascertained? The resolution of these problems will depend on the particular
contract and applicable pricing legislation.157 Any general solution offered
must of necessity be extremely broad. It is suggested, however, that a lessee
would be advised to insert a price escalation clause into the gas purchase
contract that would get the best price for the gas marketed over the life of
the contract. Such a clause would have to be tailored to suit the particular
field and external market factors. 15 After inserting such a clause, the lessee
could argue that he was acting as a prudent operator seeking the best obtain-
able price for the minerals to be marketed.
5. Express Covenants to Market
One Canadian writer has stated that:
The issue of marketing is of such importance to the lessor that he
would be well advised to insist upon an express covenant imposing
some duty on the lessee to use due diligence in obtaining a market
for any production encountered in the demised premises.)59
It appears that the interests of both the lessor and lessee demand that there
should be some express provision concerning the lessees obligation to mar-
ket. Yet, most leases are silent on this point. It is conceded that conservation
legislation and a reasonably well-regulated pricing structure will fill in some
of the gaps. Nevertheless, there are some demonstrable situations in Canada
in which a covenant to market could be implied.
C. Crown Leases
None of the Crown leases employed in Canada contain an express
stipulation that the production is to be marketed. Legislation00 governing
hereof provided that either the Vendor or the Purchaser may at any time
cancel this agreement by 30 days' notice of writing.
156. Rae, Royalty Clauses in Soil and Gas Leases, 4 ALTA. L. lEv. 828, 327(1965).
157. See The Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 158, § 6. The Public Utilities
Board can fix the field price for gas.
158. See Taylor, Escalation Clauses in Gas Purchase Contracts, 3 ALTA. L.
REv. 255 (1964).
159. J. BALLEm, Tm-: O. AND GAS LEASE IN CANADA 183 (1973).
160. See Oil & Gas Land Regulations S.O.R.161-253 Reg. 63 (Canada);
Mines & Minerals Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 238, §157 (Alberta); Petroleum & Natural
Gas Act, Stat. B.C. 1965, c. 33, § 77 (British Columbia); Petroleum & Natural
Gas Regulations 1969, O.C. 8/69 Regs. 43, 55 (Saskatchewan).
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such leases merely states that they shall continue in existence as long as
there is paying production. It is most unlikely, but not inconceivable, that
there could be production under a Crown lease without marketing. In this
situation a covenant to market could be implied.
VII. CONCLUSION
The context in which the Canadian oil and gas industry operates differs
substantially from that in which the doctrine of implied covenants originally
developed in the United States. The influences on the development of the
doctrine in Canada are different. The lessee's control and administration of
the lessor's interest is a primary concern; prompt and immediate develop-
ment is less important. Such differences do not, however, deny implied
covenants a significant role in oil and gas leases.
The doctrine has already molded the form of the express covenants
concerning exploration, operation of wells, and protection from drainage.
Despite the extent of express provisions, covenants have been implied in
these areas and will likely be implied in the future. Express provision is
largely absent in the areas of additional development and marketing, and
accordingly it appears that these are particularly fertile areas for the impli-
cation of obligations. Although patterns of landholdings and conservation
legislation may discourage appropriate litigation, they do not preclude
implied obligations.
An important conclusion of this article is that Crown leases recognize
and respect the doctrine of implied covenants. In varying degrees the Crown
has sought to render its reliance upon the doctrine unnecessary, but it is
evident that the Crown will not hesitate to invoke it.
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